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We present a novel, game theoretic representation of a multi-agent prediction
market using a partially observable stochastic game with information (POSGI).
We then describe a correlated equilibrium (CE)-based solution strategy for this
game which enables each agent to dynamically calculate the prices at which it
should trade a security in the prediction market. We have extended our results
to risk averse traders and shown that a Pareto optimal correlated equilibrium
strategy can be used to incentively truthful revelations from risk averse agents.
Simulation results comparing our CE strategy with five other strategies com-
monly used in similar markets, with both risk neutral and risk averse agents,
show that the CE strategy improves price predictions and provides higher util-
ities to the agents as compared to other existing strategies.
1 Introduction
Forecasting the outcome of events that will happen in the future is a frequently
indulged and important task for humans. It is encountered in various domains
such as forecasting the outcome of geo-political events, betting on the outcome
of sports events, forecasting the prices of financial instruments such as stocks,
and casual predictions of entertainment events. Despite the ubiquity of such
forecasts, predicting the outcome of future events is a challenging task for hu-
mans or even computers - it requires extremely complex calculations involving
a reasonable amount of domain knowledge, significant amounts of information
processing and accurate reasoning. Recently, a market-based paradigm called
prediction markets has shown ample success to solve this problem by using the
aggregated ‘wisdom of the crowds’ to predict the outcome of future events. This
is evidenced from the successful predictions of actual events done by prediction
markets run by the Iowa Electronic Marketplace(IDEM), Tradesports, Holly-
wood Stock Exchange, the Gates-Hillman market [26], and by companies such
as Hewlett Packard [29], Google [7] and Yahoo’s Yootles [34]. A prediction mar-
ket for a real-life event (e.g., “Will Obama win the 2008 Democratic Presidential
nomination?”) is run for several days before the event happens. The event has
a binary outcome (yes/no or 1/0). On each day, humans, called traders, that
are interested in the outcome of the event express their belief on the possible
outcome of the event using the available information related to the event. The
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information available to the different traders is asymmetric, meaning that dif-
ferent traders can possess bits and pieces of the whole information related to the
event. The belief values of the traders about the outcome of the event are ex-
pressed as probabilities. A special entity called the market maker aggregates the
probabilities from all the traders into a single probability value that represents
the possible outcome of the event. The main idea behind the prediction mar-
ket paradigm is that the collective, aggregated opinions of humans on a future
event represents the probability of occurrence of the event more accurately than
corresponding surveys and opinion polls. Despite their overwhelming success,
many aspects of prediction markets such as a formal representation of the mar-
ket model, the strategic behavior of the market’s participants and the impact of
information from external sources on their decision making have not been ana-
lyzed extensively for a better understanding. We attempt to address this deficit
in this paper by developing a game theoretic representation of the traders’ inter-
action and determining their strategic behavior using the equilibrium outcome
of the game. We have developed a correlated equilibrium (CE)-based solution
strategy for a partially observable stochastic game representation of the predic-
tion market. We have also empirically compared our CE strategy with five other
strategies commonly used in similar markets, with both risk neutral and risk
averse agents, and showed that the CE strategy improves price predictions and
provides higher utilities to the agents as compared to other existing strategies.
2 Related Work
Prediction markets were started in 1988 at the Iowa Electronic Marketplace
[19] to investigate whether betting on the outcome of gee-political events (e.g.
outcome of presidential elections, possible outcome of international political or
military crises, etc.) using real money could elicit more accurate information
about the event’s outcome than regular polls. Following the success of prediction
markets in eliciting information about events’ outcomes, several other predic-
tion markets have been started that trade on events using either real or virtual
money. Prediction markets have been used in various scenarios such as pre-
dicting the outcome of gee-political events such as U.S. presidential elections,
determining the outcome of sporting events, predicting the box office perfor-
mance of Hollywood movies, etc. Companies such as Google, Microsoft, Yahoo
and Best Buy have all used prediction markets internally to tap the collective in-
telligence of people within their organizations. The seminal work on prediction
market analysis [13, 32, 33] has shown that the mean belief values of individual
traders about the outcome of a future event corresponds to the event’s market
price. Since then researchers have studied prediction markets from different per-
spectives. Some researchers have studied traders’ behavior by modeling their
interactions within a game theoretic framework. For example, in [3, 11] the
authors have used a Shapley-Shubik game that involves behavioral assumptions
on the agents such as myopic behavior and truthful revelations and theoretically
analyzed the aggregation function and convergence in prediction markets. Chen
et. al. [4] characterized the uncertainty of market participants’ private informa-
tion by incorporating aggregate uncertainty in their market model. However,
both these models consider traders that are risk-neutral, myopic and truthful.
Subsequently, in [6] the authors have relaxed some of these assumptions within
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a Bayesian game setting and investigated the conditions under which the play-
ers reveal their beliefs truthfully. Dimitrov and Sami [9] have also studied the
effect of non-myopic revelations by trading agents in a prediction market and
concluded that myopic strategies are almost never optimal in the market with
the non-myopic traders and there is a need for discounting. Other researchers
have focused on designing rules that a market maker can use to combine the
opinions (beliefs) from different traders. Hanson [15] developed a market scor-
ing rule that is used to reward traders for making and improving a prediction
about the outcome of an event. He further showed how any proper scoring rule
can serve as an automated market maker. Das [8] studied the effect of spe-
cialized agents called market-makers which behave as intermediaries to absorb
price shocks in the market. Das empirically studied different market-making
strategies and concludes that a heuristic strategy that adds a random value to
zero-profit market-makers improves the profits in the markets.
The main contribution of our paper, while building on these previous direc-
tions, is to use a partially observable stochastic game (POSG) [14] that can be
used by each agent to reason about its actions. Within this POSG model, we
calculate the correlated equilibrium strategy for each agent using the aggregated
price from the market maker as a recommendation signal. We have also con-
sidered the risk preferences of trading agents in prediction markets and shown
that a Pareto optimal correlated equilibrium solution can incentively truthful
revelation from risk averse agents. We have compared the POSG/correlated
equilibrium based pricing strategy with five different pricing strategies used in
similar markets with pricing data obtained from real prediction prediction mar-
ket events. Our results show that the agents using the correlated equilibrium
strategy profile are able to predict prices that are closer to the actual prices that
occurred in real markets and these traders also obtain 35− 127% higher profits.
3 Preliminaries
Prediction Market. Our prediction market consists of N traders, with each
trader being represented by a software trading agent that performs actions on
behalf of the human trader. The market also has a set of future events whose
outcome has not yet been determined. The outcome of each event is considered
as a binary variable with the outcome being 1 if the event happens and the
outcome being 0 if it does not. Each outcome has a security associated with
it. A security is a contract that yields payments based on the outcome of an
uncertain future event. Securities can be purchased or sold by trading agents
at any time during the lifetime of the security’s event. A single event can have
multiple securities associated with it. Trading agents can purchase or sell one
or more of the securities for each event at a time. A security expires when the
event e associated with it happens at the end of the event’s duration. At this
point the outcome of the event has just been determined and all trading agents
are notified of the event’s outcome. The trading agents that had purchased the
security during the lifetime of the event then get paid $1 if the event happens
with an outcome of 1, or, they do not get paid anything and lose the money
they had spent on buying the security if the event happens with an outcome
of 0. On each day, a trading agent makes a decision of whether to buy some
securities related to ongoing events in the market, or whether to sell or hold
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some securities it has already purchased.
Figure 1: Essential operations performed by a trading agent in a prediction
market and the portion of the prediction market where the POSG representation
is applied.
Market Maker. Trading in a prediction market is similar to the continuous
double auction (CDA) protocol. However, using the CDA directly as the trading
protocol for a prediction market leads to some problems such as the thin market
problem (traders not finding a trading partner immediately) and traders poten-
tially losing profit because of revealing their willingness to trade beforehand to
other traders. To address these problems, prediction markets use a trading in-
termediary called the market maker. The market maker aggregates the buying
and selling prices of a security reported in the trades from the trading agents
(they can be identical) and ‘posts’ these prices in the market. Trading agents
interact with the market maker to buy and sell securities, so that they do not
have to wait for another trading agent to arrive before they can trade. A market
maker uses a market scoring rule (MSR) to calculate the aggregated price of a
security. Recently, there has been considerable interest in analyzing the MSRs
[5, 15, 27] and an MSR called the logarithmic MSR (LMSR) has been shown to
guarantee truthful revelation of beliefs by the trading agents [15]. LMSR allows
a security’s price, and payoffs to agents buying/selling the security, to be ex-
pressed in terms of its purchased or outstanding quantity. Therefore, the ‘state’
of the securities in the market can be captured only using their purchased quan-
tities. The market-maker in our prediction market uses LMSR to update the
market price and to calculate the payoffs to trading agents. We briefly describe
the basic mechanism under LMSR. Let Ξ be the set of securities in a prediction
market and q = (q1, q2...q|Ξ|) denote the vector specifying the number of units
of each security held by the different trading agents at time t. The LMSR first
calculates a cost function to reflect the total money wagered in the prediction
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market by the trading agents as: C(q) = b·ln(
∑|Ξ|
j=1 e
qj/b). It then calculates the
aggregated market price π for the security ξ ∈ Ξ as: πξ = e
(qξ/b)/
∑|Ξ|
j=1(e
(qj/b))
[5] 1. Trading agents inform the quantity of a security they wish to buy or
sell to the market maker. If a trading agent purchases δ units of a security, the
market maker determines the payment the agent has to make as C(q+δ)−C(q).
Correspondingly, if the agent sells δ quantity of the security, it receives a payoff
of C(q)−C(q − δ) from the market maker. Figure 1 shows the operations per-
formed by a trader (trading agent) in a prediction market and the portions of
the prediction market that are affected by the POSG representation described
in the next section.
4 Partially Observable Stochastic Games for Trad-
ing Agent Interaction
For simplicity of explanation, we consider a prediction market where a single
security is being traded over a certain duration. This duration is divided into
trading periods, with each trading period corresponding to a day in a real pre-
diction market. The ‘state’ of the market is expressed as the quantity of the
purchased units of the security in the market. At the end of each trading period,
each trading agent receives information about the state of the market from the
market maker. With this prior information, the task of a trading agent is to
determine a suitable quantity to trade for the next trading period, so that its
utility is maximized. In this scenario, the environment of the agent is partially
observable because other agents’ actions and payoffs are not known directly, but
available through their aggregated beliefs. Agents interact with each other in
stages (trading periods), and in each stage the state of the market is determined
stochastically based on the actions of the agents and the previous state. This
scenario directly corresponds to the setting of a partially observable stochastic
game [12, 14]. A POSG model offers several attractive features such as struc-
tured behavior by the agents by using best response strategies, stability of the
outcome based on equilibrium concepts, lookahead capability of the agent to plan
their actions based on future expected outcomes, ability to represent the tem-
poral characteristics of the interactions between the agents, and, enabling all
computations locally on the agents so that the system is robust and scalable.
Previous research has shown that information related parameters in a predic-
tion market such as information availability, information reliability, information
penetration, etc., have a considerable effect on the belief (price) estimation by
trading agents. Based on these findings, we posit that a component to model
the impact of information related to an event should be added to the POSG
framework. With this feature in mind, we propose an interaction model called
a partially observable stochastic game with information (POSGI) for capturing
the strategic decision making by trading agents. A POSGI is defined as:
Γ = (N,S, (Ai)i∈N , (Ri)i∈N , T, (Oi)i∈N ,Ω, (Ii)i∈N ), where N is a finite set of
agents, S is a finite, non-empty set of states - each state corresponding to certain
1Parameter b (determined by the market maker) controls the monetary risk of the market
maker as well as the quantity of shares that trading agents can trade at or near the current
price without causing massive price swings. Larger values for b allows trading agents to trade
more frequently but also increases the market maker’s chances to lose money.
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quantity of the security being held (purchased) by the trading agents. Ai is a
finite non-empty action space of agent i s.t. ak = (a1,k, ..., a|N |,k) is the joint ac-
tion of the agents and ai,k is the action that agent i takes in state k. In terms of
the prediction market, a trading agent’s action corresponds to certain quantity
of security it buys or sells, while the joint action corresponds to changing the
purchased quantity for a security and taking the market to a new state. Ri,k is
the reward or payoff for agent i in state k which is calculated using the LMSR
market maker. T : T (s, a, s′) = P (s′|s, a) is the transition probability of moving
from state s to state s′ after joint action a has been performed by the agents.
Oi is a finite non-empty set of observations for agent i that consists of the mar-
ket price and the information signal, and oi,k ∈ Oi is the observation agent i
receives in state k. Ω : Ω(sk, Ii,k, oi,k) = P (oi,k|sk, Ii,k) is the observation prob-
ability for agent i of receiving observation oi,k in state sk when the information
signal is Ii,k. Finally, Ii is the information set received by agent i for an event
Ii =
⋃
k Ii,k where Ii,k ∈ {−1, 0,+1} is the information received by agent i in
state k. The complete information arriving to the market I =
⋃
i∈N Ii is tempo-
rally distributed over the duration of the event, and, following the information
arrival patterns observed in stock markets [23], we assume that new information
arrives following a Poisson distribution. Information that improves the proba-
bility of the positive outcome of the event is considered positive(Ii,k = +1) and
vice-versa, while information that does not affect the probability is considered
to have no effect (Ii,k = 0). For example, for a security related to the event
“Obama wins 2008 presidential elections”, information about Oprah Winfrey
endorsing Obama would be considered high impact positive information and
information about Obama losing the New Hampshire Primary would be consid-
ered negative information.
Based on the POSGI formulation of the prediction market, the interaction of
an agent with the environment (prediction market) and the information source
can be represented by the transition diagram shown in Figure 22. The environ-
ment (prediction market) goes through a set of states S˜ = {s1, ..., sH} : S˜ ∈ S,
where H is the duration of the event in the prediction market and sh represents
the state of the market during trading period h. This state of the market is not
visible to any agent. Instead, each agent i has its own internal belief state Bi,h
corresponding to its belief about the actual state sh. Bi,h gives a probability
distribution over the set of states S, where Bi,h = (b1,h, ..., b|S|,h). Consider
trading period h− 1 when the agents perform the joint action ah−1. Because of
this joint action of the agents the environment stochastically changes to a new
state sh, defined by the state transition function T (sh−1, ah−1, sh). There is also
an external information state, Ih, that transitions to the next state Ih+1 given
by the Poisson distribution [23] from which the information signal is sampled.
The agent i doesn’t directly see the environment state, but instead receives an
observation oi,Sh = (πsh , Ii,sh), that includes the market price πsh correspond-
ing to the state sh as informed by the market maker, and the information signal
Ii,sh . The agent i then uses a belief update function to update its beliefs. Fi-
nally, agent i selects an action using an action selection strategy and receives a
reward Ri,sh .
2We have only shown one agent i to keep the diagram legible, but the same representation
is valid for every agent in the prediction market. The dotted lines represent that the reward
and environment state is determined by the joint action of all agents.
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s1 s2 s3 sH . . . 
Bi,1 Bi,2 Bi,3 Bi,H . . . 
I1 I2 I3 IH . . . 
oi,1 oi,2 oi,3 oi,H
ai,1 ai,2 ai,3 ai,H
Ri,1 Ri,2 Ri,3 Ri,H
Hidden Environment (Prediction Market)
Agent i
Information
T(s1,a1,s2)
b(b1,o1,a1)
Transitions using Poisson distribution
event 
announced
event 
ended
T(s2,a2,s3) T(s1,a1,s2)
b(b2,o2,a2) b(bH+1,oH+1,aH+1)
observation
of agent i
belief state
prediction 
market's state
information state
reward for 
agent i action by 
agent i
the length of the bars indicate the strength of the information's impact
high impact information low impact information
Figure 2: An agent interactions with the hidden environment (prediction mar-
ket) and an external information source.
4.1 Trading agent belief update function
Recall from Section 4 that a belief state of a trading agent is a probability
vector that gives a distribution over the set of states S in the prediction market,
i.e. Bi,h = (b1,h, ..., b|S|,h). A trading agent uses its belief update function
b : ℜ|S| × Ai × Oi → ℜ
|S| to update its belief state based on its past action
ai,h−1, past belief state Bi,h−1 and the observation oi,Sh . The calculation of
the belief update function for each element of the belief state, bs′,h, s
′ ∈ S, is
described below:
bs′,h = P (s
′|ai,h−1, oi) =
P (s′, ai,h−1, oi, )
P (ai,h−1, oi)
=
P (oi|s
′, ai,h−1) · P (s
′, ai,h−1)
P (oi|ai,h−1)P (ai,h−1)
(1)
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Because ai,h−1 is conditionally independent given s
′ and oi is conditionally in-
dependent given ai,h−1, we can rewrite Equation 1 as:
bs′,h =
P (oi|s
′) · P (s′, ai,h−1)
P (oi)P (ai,h−1)
=
∑
ι∈I P (ι)P (oi|s
′, ι)
∑
s∈S P (s)P (s
′|s, ai,h−1)P (ai,h−1)
P (oi)P (ai,h−1)
=
∑
ι∈I P (ι)P (oi|s
′, ι)
∑
s∈S P (s)P (s
′|s, ai,h−1)
P (oi)
=
∑
ι∈I P (ι)Ω(s
′, ι, oi)
∑
s∈S T (s, ai,h−1, s
′)bs,h−1
P (oi)
(2)
All the terms in the r.h.s. of the Equation 2 can be calculated by an agent:
P (ι) is the probability of receiving information signal ι and is available from
the Poisson distribution [23] for the information arrival, Ω(s′, ι, oi) is the prob-
ability of receiving observation oi in state s
′ when the information signal is ι,
T (s, ai,h−1, s
′) is the probability that the state s transitions to state s′ after
agent i takes action ai,h−1, bs,h−1 is the past belief of agent i about state s,
P (oi) is the probability of receiving observation oi, which is constant and can
be viewed as a normalizing constant.
q
q+2 q-2
q-4
q-1q+1
q-3q+3
q+4
-1,-1
+1,+1
0, 0
+1,-1
-1,+1
+1,+1
-1,-1
-1,0
0,+1
0,-1
+1,0
+1,0
0,+1
-1,0
0,-1
-1,-1
+1,+1
0,0
-1,+1
+1,-1
0,0
-1,+1
+1,-1
-1,-1
0,+1
+1,0 -1,0
0,-1
-1,-1
0,0
-1,+1
+1,-1
...
...
...
...
+1,+1
-1,0
0,-1
+1,0
0,+1
+1,0
0,+1
0, 0
+1,-1
-1,+1
+1,+1
Figure 3: Finite state automata of the environment represented by the number
of outstanding units of the security, q, in the prediction market.
4.2 Trading agent action selection strategy
The objective of a trading agent in a prediction market is to select an action
at each stage so that the expected reward that it receives is maximized. To
understand this action selection process, we consider the decision problem facing
each trading agent. Consider two agents whose available actions during each
time step are to buy (=+1) or sell(=-1) only one unit of the security or not
8
C(q) - C(q-1),
C(q) - C(q-1)
C(q) - C(q-1),
         0
C(q) - C(q-1),
C(q+1) - C(q)
        0,
C(q) - C(q-1)
         0,
         0
         0,
C(q+1) - C(q)
C(q+1) - C(q),
C(q) - C(q-1)
C(q+1) - C(q),
          0
C(q+1) - C(q),
C(q+1) - C(q)
Sell Hold Buy
Sell
Hold
Buy
Player 2
Player 1
Figure 4: Two player normal form game in a state for which the number of
outstanding shares is q.
do anything (=0) by holding the security. Let the market state be denoted by
q, the number of purchased units of the security. Based on the set of actions
available to each agent, the state can transition to one of the following states
q+2 (both agents buy), q+1 (only one agent buys), q (both agents hold, or, one
agent buys while the other agent sells, resulting in no transition), q + 1 (only
agent sells), and q+ 2 (both agents sell), as shown in Figure 3. We can expand
this state space further by adding more states and transitions, but the number
of states remains finite because the set of states S of the POSGI is finite. Also,
since the number of units of a security is finite, the number of transitions from a
state is guaranteed to be bounded. We can construct a normal form game from
this representation to capture the decision problem for each agent. The payoff
matrix for this 2-player game at state q is shown in Figure 4. From this payoff
matrix, we can use game-theoretic analysis to determine equilibrium strategies
for each trading agent and find the actions that maximize its expected reward,
as described below.
4.3 Correlated Equilibrium (CE) calculation
In the POSGI, the aggregated price information received by a trading agent
from the market maker can be treated as a recommendation signal for selecting
the agent’s strategy. This situation lends itself to a correlated equilibrium (CE)
[1] where a trusted external agent privately recommends a strategy to play to
each player. A CE is more preferred to the Nash or Bayesian Nash equilibrium
because it can lead to improved payoffs, and it can be calculated using a linear
program in time polynomial in the number of agents and number of strategies.
Each agent i has a finite set of strategy profiles, Φi defined over its ac-
tion space Ai. The joint strategy space is given by Φ =
∏|N |
i=1 Φi and let
Φ−i =
∏
j 6=i Φj. Let φ ∈ Φ denote a strategy profile and φi denote player
i’s component in φ. The utility received by each agent i corresponds to its
payoff or reward and is given by the agent i’s utility function ui(φ) = Ri
(for legibility we have dropped state k, but the same calculation applies at
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every state). A correlated equilibrium is a distribution p on Φ such that for
all agents i and all strategies φi, φ
′
i if all agents follow a strategy profile φ
that recommends player i to choose strategy φi, agent i has no incentive to
play another strategy φ′i instead. This implies that the following expression
holds:
∑
φ−i∈Φ−i
p(φ)(ui(φ) − ui(φ
′
i, φ−i)) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N , ∀φi, φ
′
i ∈ Φi and where
ui(φ
′
i, φ−i) is the utility that agent i gets when it changes its strategy to φ
′
i while
all the other agents keep their strategies fixed at φ−i and p(φ) is the probability
of realizing a given strategy profile φ.
Theorem 1. A correlated equilibrium exists in our POSGI-based prediction
market representation at each stage (trading period).
Proof. At each stage in our prediction market, we can specify the correlated
equilibrium by means of linear constraints as given below:
∑
φ−i∈Φ−i
p(φ)(ui(φ)− ui(φ
′
i, φ−i)) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N, ∀φi, φ
′
i ∈ Φi (3)
∑
φ∈Φ
p(φ) = 1, (4)
p(φ) ≥ 0 (5)
Equation 3 states that when agent i is recommended to select strategy φi, it
must get no less utility from selecting strategy φi as it would from selecting any
other strategy φ′i. Constraints 4 and 5 guarantee that p is a valid probability
distribution. We can rewrite the linear program specification of the correlated
equilibrium above by adding an objective function to it.
max
∑
φ∈Φ
p(φ), or min −
∑
φ∈Φ
p(φ) s.t. (6)
∑
φ∈Φ,φ−i∈Φ−i
p(φ)(ui(φ)− ui(φ
′
i, φ−i)) ≥ 0, (7)
φ ≥ 0 (8)
Program 7 is either trivial with a maximum of 0 or unbounded. Hoense-
laar [16] proved that there is a correlated equilibrium if and only if Program
7 is unbounded. To prove the unboundedness we consider the dual problem of
Equation 7 given in Equation 10.
max 0, s.t. (9)
∑
φ∈Φ,φ−i∈Φ−i
p(φ)[(ui(φ) − ui(φ
′
i, φ−i)]
T ≤ −1 (10)
φ ≥ 0 (11)
where for every p(φ) there is p(φ) such that p(φ)[(ui(φ)− ui(φ
′
i, φ−i)]p(φ) = 0.
Also in [28], the authors showed that the problem given in Equation 10
is always infeasible. From operations research we know that when the dual
problem is infeasible the primal problem is feasible and unbounded. This means
that the primal problem from Equation 7 is always unbounded. We can then
conclude that there is at least one correlated equilibrium in every trading period
of the prediction market.
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The CE calculation algorithm used by the trading agents in our agent-based
prediction market is shown in Algorithm 1. The calculation of the matrix values
of the U matrix must be done once for each of the N agents. Using the ellipsoid
algorithm [28] the computation of the utility difference ui(φ) − ui(φi, φ−i) for
each agent i can be done in |Φi|
2 time. Therefore, the time complexity of the
CECalc algorithm during each trading period comes to N × |Φi|
2.
CECalc(D,Φ)
Input: D,Φ //D is the duration of the market, Φ is the set of strategies
Output: p //correlated equilibrium
foreach t← 0 to D do
//do this in each trading period
Let U be the matrix consisting of the values of (ui(φ) − ui(φi, φ−i)),
∀i ∈ N,φ ∈ Φ, φ−i ∈ Φi
p′t ← getDualDistribution(Φ, U);
pt ← solve for pt s.t. ptU
T p′t = 0;
return pt;
end
GetDualDistribution(Φ, U)
Input: Φ, U
Output: ∆
l = 0;
p′l ∈ [0, 1];
∆ = {};
while UT · p′l ≤ −1 is feasible do
∆ = ∆+ p′l;
p′l+1 = pl + ǫ
N ; //increase all elements of p′ by some small amounts
from vector ǫN
l ++;
end
return ∆;
Algorithm 1: Correlated Equilibrium Algorithm
4.4 Correlated Equilibrium with Trading Agents’ Risk Pref-
erences
Incorporating the risk preferences of the trading agents is an important factor
in prediction markets. For example, the erroneous result related to the non-
correlation between the trader beliefs and market prices in a prediction market
in [24] was because the risk preferences of the traders were not accounted for,
as noted in [13]. This problem is particularly relevant for risk averse traders
because the beliefs(prices) and risk preferences of traders have been reported
to be directly correlated [10, 20]. In this section, we examine CE that provides
truthful revelation incentives in the prediction market where the agent popula-
tion has different risk preferences. The risk preference of an agent i is modeled
through a utility function called the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
We use CRRA utility function to model risk averse agents because it allows to
model the effect of different levels of risk aversion and it has been shown to be a
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better model than alternative families of risk modeling utilities [31]. It has been
widely used for modeling risk aversion in various domains including economic
domain [17], psychology [21] and in the health domain [2]. The CRRA utility
function is given below:
ui(Ri) =
R1−θii
1− θi
, if θi 6= 1
= ln(Ri), if θi = 1
Here, −1 < θi < 1 is called the risk preference factor of agent i and Ri is the
payoff or reward to agent i calculated using the LMSR [5]. When Ri < 0, we
may get a utility in the form of a complex number. In that case, we convert
the complex number to a real number by calling an existing function that uses
magnitude and the angle of the complex number for conversion. For a risk
neutral agent, θi = 0, which makes ui = Ri, as we have assumed for our CE
analysis of the risk neutral agent in Section 4.3. For risk averse agents, θi > 0.
This makes the CRRA utility function concave. But the concave structure of
the utility ui for a risk averse agent does not affect the existence of at least one
correlated equilibrium because the unboundedness of Equation 7 is not affected
by the concave structure of ui. However, the equilibrium obtained with the
risk averse utility function can be different from the one obtained with the risk
neutral utility function - because the best response p(φ) to p(φ−i) calculated
with the risk neutral utility function might not remain the best response when
the agents are risk averse and use the risk averse utility function. To find
a correlated equilibrium p(φ) in the market with risk averse agents, we first
characterize the set of all Pareto optimal strategy profiles. A strategy profile
φP is Pareto optimal if there does not exist another strategy profile φ′ such that
ui(φ
′) ≥ ui(φ
P ) ∀i ∈ N with at least one inequality strict. In other words, a
Pareto optimal strategy profile is one such that no trader could be made better
off without making someone else worse off. A Pareto optimal strategy profile
can be found by maximizing weighted utilities
maxφ
|N |∑
i=1
λiui(φ) for some λi (12)
Setting λi = 1 for all i ∈ N gives a utilitarian social welfare function. The max-
imization problem in Equation 12 can be solved using the Lagrangian method.
We get the following system of |N | equations:
|N |∑
i=1
λi
ui(φ)
φi
= 0 , ∀j = 1, ..., |N | (13)
that must hold at φP . Each of these equations is obtained by taking a partial
derivative of the respective agent’s weighted utility with respect to respective
agent’s strategy profile, thus solving the maximization problem given in Equa-
tion 12. By solving the system of equations 13 we get the set of Pareto optimal
strategy profiles. To determine if p(φ) is a correlated equilibrium we simply
check whether it satisfies correlated equilibrium constraints for Pareto optimal
strategy profile given below:∑
φ−i∈Φ−i
p(φ)(ui(φ) − ui(φ
′
i, φ−i)) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N, ∀φi, φ
′
i ∈ Φi
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Name Value
No. of days 50
Duration of 1 day 1sec
No. of agents 2
No. of events 1
Max. allowed buy/sell quantity of security 1
Price of security [0, 1]
Table 1: Parameters used for our simulation experiments
Proposition 1. If p is a correlated equilibrium and φP is a Pareto optimal
strategy profile calculated by p in a prediction market with risk averse agents,
then the strategy profile φP is incentive compatible, that is each agent is best off
reporting truthfully.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose that φP is not an incentive com-
patible strategy, that is, there is some other φ′ for which
ui(φ
′) ≥ ui(φ
P ) (14)
Equation 14 violates two properties of φP . First of all, since φP is Pareto
optimal, we know that Equation 14 is not true, since ui(φ
P ) ≥ ui(φ
′) by the
definition of Pareto optimal strategy profile. Secondly, if we rewrite Equation 14
as ui(φ
P )−ui(φ
′) ≤ 0 and multiply both sides by p(φP ), we get p(φP )[ui(φ
P )−
ui(φ
′)] ≤ 0. Since p is a correlated equilibrium this inequality can not hold,
otherwise it would violate the definition of the correlated equilibrium.
5 Experimental Results
We have conducted several simulations using our POSGI prediction market.
The main objective of our simulations is to test whether there is a benefit to the
agents to follow the correlated equilibrium strategy. We do this by analyzing
the utilities of the agents and the market price. The default values for the
statistical distributions for market related parameters such as the number of
days over which the market runs representing the duration of an event and the
information signal arrival rate were taken from data obtained from the Iowa
Electronic Marketplace(IEM) movie market for the event Monsters Inc. [19]
and are shown in Table 1.
For all of our simulations, we assume there is one event in the market with
two outcomes (positive or negative); each outcome has one security associated
with it. We consider events that are disjoint (non-combinatorial). This allows us
to compare our proposed strategy empirically with other existing strategies while
using real data collected from the IEM, which also considers non-combinatorial
events. Since we consider disjoint events, having one event vs. multiple events
does not change the strategic behavior of the agent or the results of each agent3.
We report the market price for the security corresponding to the outcome of the
event being 1 (event occurs).
3We have verified positively that our system can scale effectively with the number of events
and agents.
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We compare the trading agents’ and market’s behavior under various strate-
gies employed by the agents. We use the following five well-known strategies for
comparison [22] which are distributed uniformly over the agents in the experi-
ments.
1. ZI (Zero Intelligence) - each agent submits randomly calculated quantity
to buy or sell.
2. ZIP (Zero Intelligence Plus) - each agent selects a quantity to buy or sell
that satisfies a particular level of profit by adopting its profit margin based
on past prices.
3. CP (by Preist and Tol) - each agent adjusts its quantity to buy or sell based
on past prices and tries to choose that quantity so that it is competitive
among other agents.
4. GD (by Gjerstad and Dickhaut) - each agent maintains a history of past
transactions and chooses the quantity to buy or sell that maximizes its
expected utility.
5. DP (Dynamic Programming solution for POSG game) - each agent uses
dynamic programming solution to find the best quantity to buy or sell
that maximizes its expected utility given past prices, past utility, past
belief and the information signal [14].
6. CE (Correlated equilibrium solution) - each agent uses Algorithm 1 from
Section 4.3 to determine a correlated equilibrium strategy that gives a
recommended quantity to buy or sell.
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Figure 5: (a) Percentage of the number of days each compared trading strategy
follows a correlated equilibrium strategy, (b) Market Prices, and, (c) Utilities of
the risk neutral agent while using different trading strategies.
5.1 Risk-neutral Agents
For our first group of experiments we assume that the agents are risk neutral.
First, we attempt to understand the correspondence between our CE strategy
and each of the other compared strategies. For comparing the CE strategy with
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each strategy, we ran the simulations with identical settings, once with agents
using the CE strategy for making trading decisions and then with the same
agents using the compared strategy for making trading decisions. Figure 5(a)
shows the number of times(days) an action recommended to a trading agent by
the CE strategy is the same as the action recommended to a trading agent by
one of the compared strategies, expressed as a percentage. We observe that the
action recommended to a trading agent employing the ZI strategy is the same
as the action recommended to a trading agent using CE strategy only 11% of
the time, while for the trading agent using the more refined DP strategy it is the
same 68% of the time. The higher percentage of adoption of the CE strategy by
the more refined strategies indicates that the DP strategy is more sophisticated
than simpler strategies.
In our next set of experiments, we compare the market prices and utili-
ties obtained by a trading agent over time (days) while using different trading
strategies. In each simulation run, the trading agent uses one of the compared
strategies for determining its action at each time step (day). We compare the
cumulative market prices and utilities for each such simulation. We report a
scenario where the event in the prediction market happens and show the market
prices and utilities for the security corresponding to the positive outcome of the
event. In this scenario, the market price should approach $1 (event happens)
as the prediction market’s duration nears end. Figure 5(b) shows the market
prices of the orders placed by the trading agents during the duration of the event
for different strategies. We observe that agents using the CE strategy perform
better since they are able to trade at prices that are closer to $1, indicating that
agents using the CE strategy are able to respond to other agents’ strategies
and predict the aggregated price of the security more efficiently. This efficiency
is further supported by the graph in Figure 5(c) that shows the utility of the
agents while using different strategies. We see that the agents using the CE
strategy are finally able to obtain 38% more utility than the agents following
the next best performing strategy (DP), and 85% more utility than the agents
following the second worst performing strategy (ZIP).
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Figure 6: Comparison of the cumulative market prices and utilities obtained by:
(a) CE and ZIP strategies, and, (b) CE and CP strategies.
For our following set of experiments, we further compare the CE strategy
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Figure 7: Comparison of the cumulative market prices and utilities obtained by:
(a) CE and GD strategies, and, (b) CE and DP strategies.
with other strategies by using two agents in the same simulation run - one
agent using CE strategy and the other agent using the compared strategy. The
results are reported in Figure 6 and 7. We can see that in each scenario the CE
strategy outperforms other strategies. From Figures 6(a) and 7(b) respectively,
we observe that the trading agent using CE strategy gets 95% more utility than
the trading agent using ZIP strategy and 41% more utility than the trading
agent using DP strategy. Overall, we can say that using the POSGI model
allows the agent to avoid myopically predicting prices and use the correlated
equilibrium to calculate prices more accurately and obtain higher utilities.
5.2 Risk averse Agents
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Figure 8: (a) Percentage of the number of days each compared trading strategy
follows a correlated equilibrium strategy, (b) Market Prices, and, (c) Utilities of
the risk averse agent while using different trading strategies.
Next, we conduct similar simulations for the market while using risk averse
agents that use the risk averse utility function given in Section 4.4. Since in
real world most people are risk averse, we ran several experiments with different
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Strat. Risk Neutral Agent Risk Averse Agent
%FCE Price Utility %FCE Price Utility
ZI 11% 36% 123% 11% 32% 132%
ZIP 26% 25% 85% 22% 26% 89%
CP 41% 23% 77% 35% 20% 83%
GD 47% 19% 52% 39% 16% 58%
DP 68% 9% 38% 60% 10% 41%
Table 2: Percentage of the number of days each compared strategy follows the
CE strategy (%FCE in cols. 2 and 5), the percentage of the difference between
each compared strategy and the CE strategy for the market price (cols. 3 and
6) and utility (cols. 4 and 7). Results are shown for both risk neutral and risk
averse trading agents.
values of the risk preference θi > 0. We report the results for θi = 0.8 (strongly
risk averse trading agent) to see a better effect of the risk averse preference of
trading agents on the market prices and their own utilities. To compare the CE
strategy with each of the other strategies we ran the simulation with identical
settings, once with risk averse agents using the CE strategy for making trading
decision and then with the same risk averse agents using the compared strategy
for making trading decisions. Figure 8(a) shows the number of times an action
recommended to a risk averse trading agent by the CE strategy is the same as
the action recommended to a risk averse trading agent by one of the compared
strategies, expressed as a percentage. We can see that the risk averse agents
employing any of the five compared strategies end up adopting the action that
it the same as the action proposed by the CE strategy only 11 − 60% of the
time. We notice that the ZI agents are not affected by the risk averse behavior
of the agents (they follow the CE strategy 11% of the time when the agents
are either risk averse or risk neutral) because they do not use their past utility
to determine future prices. However, other compared agent strategies use their
past utilities to predict future prices. The concave nature of the CRRA utility
function with θi > 0 lowers the utilities that these agents receive, and, this
results in these agents following the CE strategy less often. The effect of the
lowered utility due to the risk averse (concave) utility function is also seen in
Figures 8(b) and (c). Figures 8(b) shows the market prices for an event that
has a final outcome = 1. We again observe that the agents using CE strategy
are able to predict the aggregated price of the security more efficiently during
the duration of the event. Figure 8(c) that shows the utility of the risk averse
agents while using different strategies. We see that the agents using the CE
strategy are able to obtain 42% more utility than the agents following the next
best performing strategy (DP) and 127% more utility than the agents following
the worst performing strategy (ZI).
The summary of all of our results is given in Table 2. For each type of
agent, risk neutral or risk averse, the first column, %FCE , indicates percentage
of the number of days the actions of the trading agents using each compared
strategy are the same as the CE strategy. The second and the third column
show the percentage of the difference between each compared strategy and the
CE strategy for the market price and utility, respectively. In summary, the
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POSGI model and the CE strategy result in better price tracking and higher
utilities because they provide each agent with a strategic behavior while taking
into account the observations of the prediction market and the new information
of the events.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have described an agent-based POSGI prediction market with
an LMSR market maker and empirically compared different agent behavior
strategies in the prediction market. We proved the existence of a correlated equi-
librium in our POSGI prediction market with risk neutral agents, and showed
how correlated equilibrium can be obtained in the prediction market with risk
averse agents. We have also empirically verified that when the agents follow
a correlated equilibrium strategy suggested by the market maker they obtain
higher utilities and the market prices are more accurate.
In the future we are interested in conducting experiments in an n-player sce-
nario for the POSGI formulation given in Section 3 using richer commercially
available prediction market data sets. We also plan to analyze the performance
of the CE strategy in the scenarios where the outcome of the event does not
correspond to the predicted outcome of the event by the market price, i.e. when
prediction market fails. We also plan to investigate the dynamics evolving from
multiple prediction markets that interact with each other. Finally, we are in-
terested in exploring truthful revelation mechanisms that can be used to limit
untruthful bidding in prediction markets.
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